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Abstract: If different translations of the same literary work have different 
syntaxes and semantics, how are they supposed to be about one and the 
same fictional character? In order to answer this question it’s necessary 
to (a) know what fictional characters are and (b) present reference 
conditions for them. Relying on Amie Thomasson’s (1999, 2003, 2007) 
and Saul Kripke’s (1980, 2013) works I argue that fictional characters are 
abstract artifacts whose reference is fixed by the baptism performed by 
an author; and that the identity of a fictional character is preserved due 
to the maintenance of the same chain of reference. Finally, I show how 
translators maintain the chain of reference initiated by the author of a 
given work and how consequently a fictional character remains the same 
abstract artifact throughout different translations.
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1. Introduction1
Would it be plausible to say that a given work of fiction and its 
translations are about one and the same fictional character? Let’s 
take Franz Kafka’s The Metamorphosis as an example. This novella 
was first written in German (Die Verwandlung) and published 
in 1915. In the very first passage of the story, the narrator tells 
1 I’d like to thank Amie Thomasson, Jaimir Conte, Takaaki Matsui and the 
reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
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us: “Als Gregor Samsa eines Morgens aus unruhigen Träumen 
erwachte, fand er sich in seinem Bett zu einem ungeheuren 
Ungeziefer verwandelt.” (Kafka (a), 5).
Fortunately, for those who don’t know how to read in German - 
including myself - this classic novella has been translated to several 
other languages, such as English and Brazilian Portuguese. David 
Wyllie translated the previous passage as follows: “One morning, 
when Gregor Samsa woke from troubled dreams, he found himself 
transformed in his bed into a horrible vermin.” (Kafka (d), 7). 
Susan Bernofsky, for instance, in a critical edition which was 
also published in English, translated the same passage somewhat 
differently: “When Gregor Samsa woke one morning from troubled 
dreams, he found himself transformed right there in his bed into 
some sort of monstrous insect.” (Kafka (b), 3). And Modesto 
Carone chose the following words to express the passage above in 
Brazilian Portuguese: “Quando certa manhã Gregor Samsa acordou 
de sonhos intranquilos, encontrou-se em sua cama metamorfoseado 
num inseto monstruoso.” (Kafka (c), 7)
Even an untrained eye would be able to notice the syntactic 
differences among those four passages. The words used in them 
are not the same: the German passage starts with “Als” and ends 
in “verwandelt”, while the first English translation starts with 
“One” and ends in “vermin” and the second starts with “When” 
and ends in “insect”; and the Brazilian Portuguese version starts 
with “Quando” and ends in “monstruoso”2. Furthermore, the 
punctuation (therefore the rhythm of the reading and the style of 
the text) is also distinct: Wyllie’s translation has two commas while 
all the other versions used commas only once. 
2 Even though it may seem an obvious statement, that an original text and its 
translations are composed of different words and phrases, it is important to notice 
that two texts written with the same words don’t necessarily express one and the 
same work. Borges’ Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, unlikely as it may 
be, makes us wonder about the conceptual possibility of two texts being written 
with the same syntax, i.e. ipsi literis, resulting in two different works if they are 
produced in different historical contexts.
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But the contrasts between these passages don’t end here. 
Semantically, even though they express similar states of affairs, 
they do not mean the same things. The Brazilian Portuguese passage 
states that Samsa suffered a metamorphosis, while the English 
versions say he went through a transformation. The German word 
“ungeheuren” is closest in meaning to “monstrous” (it denotes 
something not only frightening and disgusting, but also unnatural) 
instead of “horrible”, which was the choice made by Wyllies in the 
English translation.
The distinctions abound when we analyze the first sentences 
of Kafka’s work. And it gets even thornier when we think about 
works with peculiar vocabularies such as James Joyce’s Ulysses 
and Guimarães Rosa’s The Devil to Pay in the Backlands. Then 
it seems fair to argue that we do not have the same literary 
experiences when we read different translations of the same 
work. But what happens to the fictional characters throughout 
these different translations? Do they remain the same? Or do we 
have for example four different Gregor Samsas originated from 
each of the passages quoted above?
In this paper I am going to argue that the one and the same 
fictional character is presented in the original work and in its 
corresponding translations. But in order to justify this thesis we 
have to (a) know what fictional characters are and (b) establish 
their reference conditions. We are going to notice that, along the 
lines presented by Amie Thomasson (1999, 2003, 2007) and Saul 
Kripke (1980, 2013), fictional characters are abstract artifacts 
whose reference is fixed by the baptism performed by an author; 
and that the ability to refer to the same fictional character is passed 
to and through the readers via a chain of reference. In sum, we 
intend to analyze the persistence of fictional characters throughout 
different translations from a metaphysical standpoint. 
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2. What is a fictional character?
Fictional characters and stories are a relevant part of our 
everyday lives. Whether you are a literature student who has to 
write a paper on Vitangelo Moscarda’s conflicts regarding personal 
identity in One, No One and One Hundred Thousand or if you just 
think it is entertaining to watch Daenerys Targaryen struggling for 
power in Game of Thrones, it is clear that we do spend some time 
discussing about, cheering for and even crying because of fictional 
characters. But what is a fictional character? Let’s look at our 
literary practices and analyze two non-controversial statements:
(1) Gregor Samsa was created by Franz Kafka.
(2) Franz Kafka published The Metamorphosis in 1915.
Let’s start with proposition (1). Authoring is an important 
concept in our literary practices because without human efforts 
there would be no such things as literary works and fictional 
characters3. Unlike mountains and oceans, whose existence and 
creation don’t depend on human intentions, fictional characters are 
attached to their author or authors, even though we might not know 
exactly who they were4.
As Amie Thomasson puts it,
One of the things we admire about certain authors is their 
ability to make up sympathetic, multidimensional characters 
3 It is important to note that this is not in properly in disagreement with what Roland 
Barthes (1977) said about the death of the author. Barthes’ perspectives had to do 
with how the author’s intentions shouldn’t affect the meaning or interpretation of 
the text she or he authored, not that the creative acts of an author are not necessary 
for the story to be produced. If individuals were not necessary for the creation of 
a story, then fictional characters could’ve been conceived as natural kinds - which 
is quite counterintuitive.
4 Which is the case of Homer, for example.
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rather than cardboard cut-outs, and at times we count our 
good luck that certain characters like Sherlock Holmes were 
created when, given a busier medical practice, Arthur Conan 
Doyle might never have created him. (Thomasson (c), 6)
So it is not controversial5 to state that Herman Melville authored 
Moby Dick and created Captain Ahab or that Dostoevsky wrote 
Crime and Punishment and created Raskolnikov; and that if they had 
dedicated their lives to some other activity than writing, we might 
not have been able to read stories about Ahab and Raskolnikov6. 
We take the process of authoring so seriously that if one person 
copies the work of another without citing or quoting him, the 
former may be accused of plagiarizing. 
An author creates fictional characters through (a) an act of 
storytelling in (b) a public language in which they (c) receive a 
proper name or at least one description. 
(a) The story needs to be expressed in a medium (written, 
filmed, performed or even transmitted orally) in order to be public, 
which means a fictional character is not something that exists “in 
the mind” of the author. If it existed in the mind of the author, as 
Roman Ingarden (1979) puts it, the fictional character would cease 
to exist as soon as the author’s thought about the character vanishes. 
And that is surely not the case because we keep on thinking and 
talking about Gregor Samsa, even long after Kafka’s death. (b) 
It has to be expressed in a public language (such as German, 
English, Brazilian Portuguese or a non-verbal language that might 
5 Terence Parsons (1980) and Edward Zalta (1983) have argued through the lenses 
of Alexius Meinong (1960) that fictional characters are not created, but selected 
from a realm of everlasting entities that subsist. But later in this section I’m going 
to give reasons for rejecting their account.
6 There are cases in which the process of creation is debatable. Did Arthur Conan 
Doyle create the London of the stories or was he referring to the non-fictional city? 
Did Leon Tolstoy create a fictional character named Napoleon or was he referring 
to the historical figure who lost the Battle of Waterloo? Are they really fictional 
places and characters? (Cf. Parsons 1980 for a discussion on “surrogate entities”).
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be understood by others) because fiction is a social institution with 
authors, readers and critics and the fictional characters come to 
existence due to our literary practices. And (c) we are only capable 
of directing our thoughts towards a fictional character and refer to 
it when it has been given either a proper name (such as “Gregor 
Samsa”, “Captain Ahab” or “Raskolnikov”) or a single or a cluster 
of descriptions (such as “the salesman who was transformed into an 
insect”, “the captain of the whaling ship Pequod” or “the student 
who killed a corrupt pawnbroker with an axe”, respectively).
Now let’s go deeper into Amie Thomasson’s theory and present 
it from a new point-of-view. If (1) is plausible, what is there for us 
to extract as a consequence?
(1) Gregor Samsa was created by Franz Kafka.
(1a) Therefore, Gregor Samsa is an artifact.
Artifacts are objects that are created intentionally by humans. 
We are surrounded by artifacts: chairs, tables, laptops, phones, 
books, etc. Actually, I am writing this paper using various artifacts 
at the same time and you are reading it using some of them as well - 
whether you are reading it online using a computer or in a physical 
copy of Cadernos de Tradução, there is no way to avoid using 
artifacts in order to read it. We could even say that this paper itself 
is an artifact composed by me. In this sense, if Gregor Samsa was 
intentionally created by Franz Kafka — who was a human being 
—, then it is an artifact.
Even though Gregor Samsa may be similar to chairs, tables and 
laptops once all of them exemplify the property of being artifacts, 
fictional characters are not made of wood or aluminum and are not 
located in space and time. In the story, Samsa is said to be (or that 
he used to be) a human being, but he is not a person in the same 
sense in which Kafka was a person. Kafka was no kind of artifact. 
So fictional characters belong to a different category from that of 
concrete objects or individuals. Which category would that be?
116Cad. Trad., Florianópolis, v. 40, nº 1, p. 110-126, jan-abr, 2020.
Tradução e metafísica: um argumento a favor das personagens ficcionais
Thomasson (1999, 2003, 2007) argues that the difference 
between fictional characters and other types of artifacts is that the 
former are abstract artifacts whereas the latter are concrete. We 
are not supposed to go to Baker Street in London in order to look 
for a detective made of flesh and bones called “Sherlock Holmes” 
because Sherlock Holmes isn’t a person who can be found in space 
and time. Someone who goes to London in order to meet Sherlock 
Holmes (or to Rio de Janeiro to mourn on Brás Cubas’ grave, etc.) 
is committing a category mistake and misunderstanding what it 
means for something to be a fictional character. 
And unlike Platonic abstracta fictional characters are not 
necessary, timeless and changeless entities (Thomasson (c), 15). 
Fictional characters are contingent because if nobody had written 
a story about them, they would not have come into existence. 
They are temporal entities because they come into existence at 
a specific time when an author writes about them. And they are 
changeable because their properties usually don’t remain the same 
throughout the same work, sequels or parodies. In this sense, 
fictional characters are similar to other abstract entities such as 
money, contracts and laws and this similarity shows that fictional 
characters are not unruly entities at all because they belong to 
metaphysical categories we are very familiar with.
Now it’s time to analyze proposition (2). We know either 
through testimony or empirical research that Franz Kafka 
published The Metamorphosis in 1915. So unless a radical skeptic 
attempts to bring an evil genius to our discussion, (2) is surely an 
uncontroversial statement. If (2) is true, what can we infer from it?
(2) Kafka published The Metamorphosis in 1915.
(2a) Therefore, there was no such thing as Gregor Samsa 
before 1915.
I’ve already mentioned that fictional characters are temporal 
entities and that they need to be expressed in a public language 
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in order to come to existence. But there is still more to be said 
departing from that conclusion. If before 1915 there was no such 
thing as Gregor Samsa, then not only the theory I’m defending 
is different from Platonism, but it is also against some strains of 
Meinongianism. According to Terence Parsons (1980), the authors 
of fiction don’t create fictional characters, but only discover or 
“select” a character from a pre-existing set of properties that are 
now individuated as fictional character. As Parsons himself puts it:
I have said that, in a popular sense, an author creates char-
acters, but this too is hard to analyze. It does not mean, for 
example, that the author brings those characters into exis-
tence, for they do not exist. Nor does he or she make them 
objects, for they were objects before they appeared in sto-
ries. We might say, I suppose, that the author makes them 
fictional objects, and that they were not fictional before the 
creative act. We might even say that the author bestows on 
them fictional existence [...], as long as this is not confused 
with ordinary existence. (Parsons 188).
Parsons (idem, 17) argues that there are fictional characters, but 
they don’t exist. This is due to the comprehension principle: for each 
object there is one and only one set of corresponding properties and 
for each set of properties there is one and only one corresponding 
object. Some of these objects exist (like chairs, tables and forks), 
some of them don’t (like round squares and fictional characters). 
But given that we can entertain meaningful thoughts about such 
non-existing objects, they need to have some sort of watered-down 
mode of existence and that is why even though they don’t exist, 
they are. I don’t want to go in further details about why existence 
should be taken univocally and “there is” and “exists” actually 
mean the same thing. The point I would like to call attention to is 
that a theory that goes along with Parsons’ claims is not consistent 
with our literary practices. First, it is not consistent with our 
practices because we do take authors to be essentially creative 
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individuals. Second, as Thomasson ((c), 9) reminds us, some of 
the properties attributed to a fictional character or work of fiction 
depend on the time the story was written. If George Orwell had 
written Animal Farm before Stalin’s time, this work could not have 
the property of being a satire of Stalinism. Third, there is the worry 
of anachronism: the words acquire meaning due to our practices 
and such atemporal realm of objects and sets of properties can’t 
refer to practices that aren’t yet even conceived of.
All in all, in the lines of Amie Thomasson’s arguments, we 
should take fictional characters as abstract artifacts created at a 
specific time when an author or authors write about them in a public 
language. Now that we know what a fictional character is, let’s carry 
on with our investigation and establish their reference conditions.
3. Reference conditions for fictional characters
Before delving into reference conditions I’d like to say a few 
things about identity conditions. Identity is a relation that every 
object maintains with itself. This relation can be divided in at least 
two types: qualitative identity and numerical identity. An object 
A is qualitatively identical to an object B if they share exactly the 
same properties. For example, if set 1 is composed of the properties 
{circle, yellow} and set 2 is composed of {circle, yellow} then we 
may affirm that set 1 is qualitatively identical to set 2. In order 
words, it means set 1 = set 2. But in a lot of cases an object changes 
some of its properties through time but still remains numerically 
the same, i.e., it remains one and the same object. The most well-
known case is the problem of personal identity. Let’s say that when 
I was a child a couple of decades ago I had, among other things, the 
properties {being short, having long hair, ...} and that right now I 
exemplify the properties {being tall, having short hair, ...}. Should 
I say that because a lot of my properties have changed through time 
I’m now a numerically different person? It doesn’t seem plausible. 
I really am the same person despite all those changes. And this is 
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exactly the problem I’m trying to solve here when it comes to the 
metaphysics of translation: is it possible for a fictional character to 
have different properties in different translations and still remain 
one and the same object?
But why am I more interested in discussing reference conditions 
than identity conditions? First, there is a huge debate on identity 
conditions for ordinary and fictional objects and I don’t have the 
space that is required for tackling such a complex problem in this 
short paper7. Second, we already know what a fictional character 
is and how to identify it. We know that Sherlock Holmes, for 
example, is a fictional detective that was created by Arthur Conan 
Doyle and that is said to have helped the Scotland Yard and to have 
lived in 221B Baker Street in London. We know that according 
to The Metamorphosis Gregor Samsa became a terrible insect. 
Intuitively, we know that Sherlock Holmes is Sherlock Holmes and 
that it is not Gregor Samsa. All it takes for one to know these facts 
is to read the corresponding books or to have a reliable testimony 
that such things were said about those characters. Third, there is 
no need to go further than we already went on this topic because all 
we need to know is if it is the case that the proper names used by 
a translator pick exactly the same fictional characters presented in 
the original corresponding works. So all we need is a compelling 
theory of reference.
According to Saul Kripke (1980), a proper name is a rigid 
designator. Being a rigid designator means that a proper name 
refers to the same corresponding individual in all possible worlds. 
We might conceive a possible world in which Einstein didn’t 
discover the theory of relativity and the individual picked by the 
proper name “Einstein” (or even by another name) would still be 
Einstein. So it’s important to explain how we come to fix, borrow 
and maintain the reference of a proper name8.
7 Cf. Thomasson 2007.
8 Cf. Devitt & Sterelny 1999.
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Kripke9 ((b), 96) says that an object “[...] may be named 
by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a 
description”. Let’s say I own a dachshund called “Dante”. Dante 
is called “Dante” because right after I adopted him I pointed to him 
and asked the people around me “what if we called him ‘Dante’?” 
and everyone said it sounded nice and agreed to use that name to 
refer to him. Now every time I use the name “Dante” the people 
who are acquainted with my dog know I’m referring to him. This 
is what Kripke called an act of dubbing or baptism. And to those 
who don’t know Dante’s name I may further say “it’s my dog” and 
then they’ll be a part of the community that uses that proper name 
to refer to that specific dog. Others who do or don’t know the name 
of my dog may also refer to him by a description such as “the dog 
my philosopher friend owns”. A disambiguation may be required 
in some occasions because there are other dogs (and even human 
beings) named “Dante” and maybe the individual I hypothesized 
about may have more than one philosopher friend or I may own 
more than one dog. But once the appropriate context is established, 
it’s clear that the reference of a proper name is fixed either by 
ostension or description.
I claim that the same happens regarding a fictional character. 
When Franz Kafka thought about writing The Metamorphosis and 
decided the main character would be named “Gregor Samsa” he 
fixed a name to the abstract artifact he created. Some characters 
don’t even need to have a name. “Frankenstein” from Mary 
Shelley’s homonymous book is the name of Dr. Frankenstein 
instead of the creature he assembled in the laboratory. The creature 
has no name, but we can still refer to it by the description “Dr. 
9 Saul Kripke (1980) has put forward his theory of reference, but he has been 
noncommittal regarding the reference to fictional characters even in his Reference 
and Existence (2013). My approach to similar to Thomasson’s (1999), but here I 
don’t rely on the reference to physical entities in order to establish the reference 
to abstract artifacts.
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Frankenstein’s creature”10. So there is no need to give a special 
account for reference fixing of fictional proper names.
But reference fixing is not enough. It’s necessary that other 
people refer to the same individual using the same name. Kripke 
((b), 96) says: “When the name is ‘passed from link to link’, the 
receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to 
use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard 
it”. In the case of the proper name “Dante” attributed to my dog, 
any speaker needs to learn from me or from someone that heard 
from me (or from someone who heard from someone who heard 
from me, etc.) that that name is supposed to be used to refer to my 
dog. Kripke ((b), 93) also says that “[...] what is true is that it’s 
in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community, 
going back to the referent himself, that we refer to a certain man”, 
which means the reference of that name is borrowed from speakers 
who ultimately learned that name from me (who initially dubbed 
or baptized the dog) and created a chain of reference that is passed 
along to other speakers. The reference is maintained as long as the 
speakers preserve the use of that name that is linked to the so-called 
act of baptism of an object or individual.
Once again, I claim that this process also occurs in fiction. 
Franz Kafka named the main character of The Metamorphosis 
“Gregor Samsa” and anyone who read the book is now a part of 
the community that uses that proper name to refer to that fictional 
character created by Kafka. Even those who have never read The 
Metamorphosis may use the name “Gregor Samsa” to refer to the 
same individual as long as they have heard that name from a reliable 
source (a professor or even a Wikipedia page) and the use of that 
name is linked to the dubbing or baptism performed by Kafka.
In the introduction of this paper I argued that an original work 
and its corresponding translations are syntactically and semantically 
10 Some may refer to Dr. Frankenstein’s creature by the name “Frankenstein”. 
This could be seen as an interesting case of reference shifting or as an inadequate 
use of that proper name (Cf. Evans 1982).
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different for many reasons. First, because different languages 
have different syntaxes. Second, because translating is an act of 
choosing which words should be applied; and different translators 
usually choose words that don’t have exactly the same meaning 
in order to translate the same sentences from the original work. 
Third, we may even make a thought experiment and think about the 
possibility of a translator committing a mistake that goes unnoticed 
by the editors. Let’s suppose Kafka wrote that Samsa’s eyes were 
blue and Modesto Carone translated “blue” as “vermelho” (“red”) 
by mistake. Would that be enough to destroy the identity of a 
fictional character?
The answer is “no”. We individuate a fictional character through 
a set of descriptions or a proper name that is coined through a 
dubbing or baptism. Once the baptism happens, all we need to do 
is discover where the chain of reference started, i.e., from where 
we learned how to use the name is question. In order words, all 
it requires is that the translator refers back to the same character 
created by the author whose work he’s translating. And that’s 
exactly what the translator does.
When David Wyllie and Modesto Carone translated Die 
Verwandlung from German to English and Brazilian Portuguese 
respectively11, they were maintaining the same chain of reference 
that Kafka started when he wrote that work. Both Wyllie and 
Carone were acquainted with Kafka’s work and they translated 
Die Verwandlung knowing that it was written by Kafka and that 
what they were doing was a translation instead of writing a new 
novel from scratch. Gregor Samsa is still called “Gregor Samsa” 
in these translations and even if it was called by another proper 
name it would still refer to the same character because “Gregor 
11 Let’s say a translator A translated Crime and Punishment from Russian to 
English and then a translator B translated the work from English to Brazilian 
Portuguese. The Brazilian Portuguese version would still preserve the numerical 
identity of Raskolnikov because it maintained the chain of reference established 
by Dostoevsky and translator A.
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Samsa” is a rigid designator12. The same chain of reference is 
maintained, so the same fictional character is presented in all 
those translations. 
Even in the thought experiment in which the translator committed 
a mistake about the color of Gregor Samsa’s eyes, the translation 
would have said something false about the one and the same 
character13. Even it wasn’t a mistake, but an adaptation (maybe 
because it would sound better for the Brazilian readers), the same 
reasoning would follow: the translation would still be adapting 
some properties that are said to be attributed to the same Gregor 
Samsa that was created by Kafka. And that is precisely the problem 
that concerned us here and that now is hopefully untangled.
Concluding remarks
Fictional characters are abstract artifacts created by an author 
when he or she tells a story in a public language and they receive a 
proper name or a single or a set of descriptions. When the author 
or authors baptize their character, they create a chain of reference 
that is passed along to and through the readers that then become 
acquainted with that proper name or descriptions. If the translator 
maintains the chain of reference that began with the author of the 
work in question, then all the translations of that story are about 
one and the same character - even if they attribute to it properties 
that were not established in the original work. In this sense, when 
we read The Metamorphosis or A Metamorfose we engage with a 
fictional character that is numerically identical to the one we find 
in Die Verwandlung, i.e., there is one and the Gregor Samsa in all 
these versions. I hope I have contributed to the Translation Studies 
12 For example, the fictional character Speedy Gonzales was named “Ligeirinho” 
in Brazilian Portuguese, but “Speedy Gonzales” and “Ligeirinho” both refer to 
Speedy Gonzales for the same reasons above.
13 Truth in fiction is another subject that is complex for me to tackle in this paper. 
Cf. Lewis, 1978.
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by analyzing the reference and identity condition of fictional 
characters from a metaphysical standpoint.
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